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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Commercial Banks and Nonbanking Institutions: 
The Question of Competition 
The tanking structure of the United States is one of the 
more dynamic components of the financial sector of the econo­
my. Laws are changing to allow banks and bank holding 
companies to expand their influence across markets and product 
lineso From i960 to 1973j for example, the number of states 
permitting commercial banks to engage in some kind of branch 
banking increased from thirty to forty-three (23). As a re­
sult , there has been a consistently high volume of bank merger 
activity during this period, larger banks merging with smaller 
banks and the smaller banks then being converted to branches. 
Table 1.1 shows that bazik consolidations ran at a rate of over 
one hundred per year from i960 to 1972. Most of these mergers 
involved the conversion of the acquired bank to a branch. 
At the same time, the growth of the bank holding company 
has become a significant factor changing the banking and finan­
cial structure in the United States. The bank holding company 
is a corporation set up for the purpose of owning or control­
ling one or more commercial banks or related nonbank companies.^  
I^n 1956 the Bank Holding Company Act was passed and bank 
holding companies owning two or more banks were put under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board. In 1970 the Act was' 
amended placing holding companies with one or more banks under -
the jurisdiction of the Board. Also, Section 4(c)(8) was ex­
panded which permits the Board to specify acceptable related 
Table 1.1 Number and changes in the number of commercial "banks 
in operation in the United States^  i960 to 1971. 
Beginning Operation 
Banks in Operation at 
Year Beginning of Year New Banks Other 
1960 13,486 152 
1961 13,484 113 
1962 13,444 183 
1963 13,439 300 
1964 13,582 335 2 
1965 13,775 198 2 
1966 13,818 122 1 
1967 13,785 107 2 
1968 13,741 86 4 
1969 13,698 130 5 
1970 13,681 185 0 
1971 13,705 201 2 
S^ource: (13) 
3 
Ceasing Operations 
Merger Absorptions 
Net Changes Banks in Operation 
Consolidations Other during Year at End of Year 
150 4 -2 15,484 
147 6 -40 15,444 
185 5 -5 15,459 
155 2 +145 15,582 
155 11 +195 15,775 
149 7 +45 15,818 
157 19 -55 15,785 
154 19 -44 15,741 
155 0 -45 15,690 
147 5 -17 15,681 
151 10 -24 15,705 
97 7 +99 15,804 
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In part, the bank holding company serves as a surogate for 
branch banking in those states where it is prohibited. The 
ultimate purpose, however, is to extend the influence of the 
corporation across as many markets and product lines as pos­
sible. Table 1.2 shows the growth of holding companies since 
i960. The most interesting aspect of this growth is that 
from i960 to 1973 the percent of commercial bank deposits in 
the United States held by holding company banks has increased 
from less than 8 percent to over 6l percent. 
Laws passed by congress and individual states have in­
creased the flexibility of banking institutions to expand 
across markets and product lines. But legislators have also 
attempted to incorporate into the statutes provisions for 
monitoring the growth of individual banking organizations. 
Such monitoring is conducted for the express purpose of pre­
venting undue concentration of resources and adverse effects 
on competition. In each piece of banking legislation specific 
reference is made insisting that no acquisition or merger be 
permitted if the result would be adverse to competition. For 
example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
in granting approval of an acquisition of bank stock by a 
nonbank activities that bank holding companies might engage 
in. Some activities include insurance, data processing, 
leasing, mortgage banking and finance companies. See (32). 
Table 1.2 Banks and deposits of bank holding companies for 
the United States, i960 to 1972. 
Number of Total Number 
Year Holding Companies of Banks 
i960 47 426 
1961 46 427 
1962 49 442 
1963 52 454 
1964 54 460 
1965 53 468 
1966 65 561 
1967 74 603 
1968 80 629 
1969 97 723 
1970 121 895 
1971 1567 2420 
1972 1607 2720 
S^ource: (4) 
F^igures reflect I970 Amendment to Bank Holding Company 
Act which requires the registration on all bank holding com­
panies previously exempt. 
6 
Deposits Percent of 
(Billions Percent of all all Commercial 
of Dollars) Commercial Banks Bank Deposits 
18.27 3.16 7.9 
19.83 3.06 8.0 
21.20 3.17 8.1 
22.53 3.35 8.2 
24.96 3.34 8.1 
27.56 3.39 8.3 
41.08 4.07 11.6 
49.82 4.39 12.6 
57.63 4.60 13.2 
62.57 5.29 14.3 
78.06 6.55 16.2 
297.0 17.56 55.1 
393.3 19.53 61.5 
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holding company shall not approve 
any...proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation 
under this section whose effect in any section of the 
country may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly...(32). 
Congress also instructed that in evaluating whether a particu­
lar nonbanking activity is permissible the Board shall con­
sider whether the 
...performance by an affiliate of a holding company 
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to 
the public, such as greater convenience, increased 
competition, gains in efficiency, that outweigh 
possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration 
of resources, decreased or unfair competition .,.(32). 
In situations concerning the acquisition of the assets of 
one bank by another the Bank Merger Act requires the appropri­
ate regulatory agency to consider "...the effect of the 
transaction on competition (including any tendency toward 
monopoly" (33). 
Though each of these laws attach great inrportance to know­
ing the competitive consequences of a bank merger or acquisition 
there is no clear definition in any of the statutes, admini­
strative regulations, or court opinions as to what ultimately 
determines how the structure of the market is to be analyzed. 
There has resulted from this lack of guidance considerable dis­
agreement among economists (and lawyers) on just how, in fact, 
the analysis should be conducted. One opinion holds that 
banks are single product firms con^ eting only with other 
banks (l6). The argument is that banks en^ hasizs relationships 
of complementary or interdependency among the financial services 
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provided by them. Individual banks^  for example, encourage 
deposit retention by assuring customers of immediate loan 
accommodations and favorable terms. Such tying arrangements 
narrow the product to a single full service concept. 
More recently, however, the majority of opinions seem to 
hold that comiiercial banks are department stores of finance 
producing a number of distinct services (l). It is asserted 
that tie-in sales are restricted to those services for which 
banks are the dominant or sole suppliers (i,e,, business loans 
and demand deposits). Services that banks and nonbanking firms 
both supply usually can be negotiated separately. Therefore, 
commercial banks compete with any number of financial insti­
tutions in providing various services to the public. They may 
include, for example, finance companies, life insurance com­
panies, mortgage banks, and savings and loan associations. 
The courts also seem to be leaning toward the concept of 
banks as multiproduct firms though this has not always been 
the situation. In a decision involving the Philadelphia 
National Bank to acquire Girard Trust Com Exchange Bank, the 
Supreme Court took the position that the narrow product defi­
nition was appropriate for determining competitive effects (35). 
It took this stand on the presumption that demand deposits were 
sufficiently unique and a dominant enough part of the activ­
ities of the banks to imply a single product firm. Recent 
cases, however, have taken a broader view of the market and 
generally conclude that banks are multiproduct organizations. 
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For example^  in the Crocker-Anglo Citizens Bank case (5^ ) which 
involved the fifth and seventh largest "banks in California, the 
District Court held the opinion that savings and loan associ­
ations, commercial finance companies, credit unions, and life 
insurance companies provide reasonable substitutes for many of 
the financial services offered by banks 
Where both a bank and a nonbank company can be owned by a 
holding company, there can be no question as to the need to 
examine the extent of competition between banks and other fi­
nancial institutions. The mandate of congress is to examine 
the effects on competition that might result from any approval 
of an acquisition or merger of such companies into a holding 
company. It is essential that the regulatory authorities and 
the courts begin seriously to consider the question of com­
petition between banks and other related companies if this 
mandate is to be properly carried out. 
It is appropriate, therefore, that the question of com­
petition and banking be examined recognizing banks as multi-
product firms. The objective of this study will be to examine 
the competitive question within the context of just one of 
these product markets, personal loans= This will provide some 
information as to whether banks, as multiproduct firms, com­
pete with other institutions. Also, it will help answer 
A^ similar ruling was given in the case of the United 
States vs. Provident National Bank, 262 Supp. 297. 1966 (36) 
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the immediate question of whether competition would "be adverse­
ly effected if a holding company is permitted to own both a 
bank and other firms also providing personal loans to the 
public. 
Competition: The Personal Loan Market 
Personal loans are direct cash loans made to individuals 
on an installment basis, in most market areas three major 
financial institutions are involved in the extension of such 
loans. Commercial banks are one of these lenders. Another 
lender is finance companies which principally engage in the ex­
tension of short-and intermediate-term credit to finance the 
purchase of commodities and services for personal consumption 
(9> p. 714), Credit unions lend a significant volume of their 
loans as personal loans. Unlike banks and finance companies, 
credit unions are cooperative associations, incorporated for 
the purpose of creating a source of credit at a fair and reason­
able rate of interest and of providing the opportunity for 
people to use and control their money for their mutual bene­
fit (31), The structure of credit unions, as compared to 
banks and finance companies, does involve differences in their 
market behavior. Nevertheless, they are subject to most of 
the same market considerations as are banks and finance com­
panies and their inclusion in the study is essential to under­
standing the extent of competition in this market. 
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The size of the personal loan market has increased sub­
stantially in past years. From i960 to the end of 1973, per­
sonal loans held by finance companies increased from "5.0 bil­
lion to 16.4 billion. Over this same period^  commercial banks 
increased their extensions of personal loans from $3.5 billion 
to #4.2 billion. Other lenders, principally credit unions, 
increased personal loans outstanding from 2,6 billion tp $10,4 
billion, (See Table 1.3). These figures represent average 
Table 1.3=, Installment credit for personal loans (billions of 
dollars) 
Year Commercial B^ nks Finance Companies 
Other , 
Financial Lenders 
1960 3,577 5.006 2.034 
1961 _c - -
1962 - - -
1903 - - -
1964 5,542 9.015 3.291 
1965 6,357 10.058 3.822 
1966 7,011 10.315 4.336 
1967 7,748 10.688 4.799 
1968 8,958 11.481 5.493 
1969 9,780 12.485 6.387 
1970 10,616 12.734 6.995 
1971 11,547 13.446 7.872 
1972 12,947 14.912 -9.063 
S^ourc e: (4), 
O^ther financial lenders consist of credit unions and mis­
cellaneous lenders. Miscellaneous lenders include savings and 
loan association and mutual savings banks. 
• "^ Data not consistent for these years. 
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aimual changes of 6.1 percent, 10.6 percent, and 15.5 percent, 
respectively. Such growth demonstrates that personal loans 
have "become an important part of the commercial banks' loan 
portfolio. It also demonstrates why the question of competi­
tion in the personal loan market is of considerable interest 
to researchers. 
If personal lending involves a homogeneous product, it 
follows that any institution involved in the extension of 
these loans competes with every other firm for available bor­
rowers, However, a variety of factors exist which raise 
suspicions as to the possibility that the personal loan mar­
ket is separated (differentiated) not only between individual 
firms but between different types of firms. Banks, for exam­
ple, may be involved in the market only to the extent they 
choose to service both their customers deposit and borrowing 
needs. State laws with different legal ceilings on interest 
charges, or with different licensing (chartering) requirements 
for banks, finance companies, or credit unions may cause each 
to service the needs of different types of borrowers. 
To demonstrate how the difference might be reflected in 
the market, examine Figures 1.1(a) and 1.1(b). Assume that 
individuals in a market can be categorized along a Vector ' 
representing the degree of risk associated with their borrowing. 
Assume that some probability may be attached to each point 
along the vector showing the likelihood of an individual in the 
market borrowing from any of the respective lenders. If the 
1 
Commero ial 
Banks 
Finance 
Companies 
Credit 
Unions 
Net Worth Of Individuals 0 
Finance 
Companies 
Commercial 
Credit Banks 
Unions 
Net Worth Of Individuals 0 
In The Market In The Market 
a b 
Figure 1,1 Example of alternative distribution of borrowers to lenders in the 
personal loan market. 
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market is competitive between institutions, the distribution 
of borrowers among lenders should resemble Figure 1.1(a), Here, 
the distributions are very nearly alike. Any individual would 
be just as likely to borrow from one institution as another 
and at approximately the same terms. If, however, the distri­
bution is more like that of Figure l,l(b), each institution 
caters to the borrowing needs of different groups of individu­
als. Competition would not be a major consideration between 
these different types of firms. 
The example describes one source of segmentation and 
demonstrates how it might be reflected in the market. There 
are, however, other factors affecting the competitive frame­
work of the personal loan market. This study, therefore, will 
direct itself to identifying the extent and cause of market 
segmentation between commercial banks, finance companies and 
credit unions = Is the market segmented? If segmented, what 
factors contribute to such segmentation? Is it supply-related, 
demand related, or is it dependent on some exogeneous parameter? 
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CHAPTER II. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
The present study examines competition in the personal 
loan market between commercial banks, finance companies, and 
credit unions. This examination of conçetition within the per­
sonal loan market is a refinement of the question of banking 
competition in general. Therefore, the survey of literature 
should describe, at least briefly, the development of research 
from this broader question to the specific topic at hand. 
Commercial Banking; The Industry and Con^ etition 
Most studies examining banking competition have done so in 
the framework of banking as a single product industry. For 
example, Frank R. Edwards' (10) study dealing with the relation­
ship of concentration to the price of bank services concerned 
only the effects of interest rates on savings deposits and 
average rates on loans. His hypotheses were: (l) that highly 
concentrated markets have lower average rates on time and 
savings deposits, and (2) that in such markets, average loan 
rates are higher. To distinguish the effects of supply and de­
mand from that of market power. Edwards estimated different 
forms of the following regression model: 
PC = constant + aiCR -h a^ C + agDi + 84D2 + agL (2.1) 
where 
PC = a performance characteristic (l) total interest paid 
on time and savings deposits to total time and sav­
ings deposits; (2) total earnings from loans to 
total loans outstanding. 
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CR = concentration (percent of bank deposits in area held 
by the largest two banks). 
C = Proxy for bank costs (average size of bank). 
Di = Proxy for demand (percent change in population). 
Da = Proxy for demand (percent deposits per capita). 
L = Consumer total loans 
The results of the analysis indicated that (l) after 
accounting for differences in bank costs and regional demand, 
concentration has a significant negative association with rates 
on time and savings deposits; (2) there is a significant posi­
tive association between concentration and interest rates on 
loans. Hence, it seems that an increase in concentration is 
harmful to the bank customer by lowering the return on savings 
and increasing the price they must pay on loans. 
However, Edwards' use of the ratio of total earnings to 
loans as a proxy of interest charges neglects to account for 
one very important consideration. The defined variable does 
not account for differences in portfolios outstanding between 
banks. If loan portfolios are significantly different between 
banks in the survey, then the estimated interest rate proxy 
may be seriously biased (29). This neglect to account for 
the variation of banks' portfolios hampered Edwards' ability 
to accurately isolate the monopoly effects. 
A later study by Eric Brucker (5) does take the discussion 
of banking con^ etition somewhat closer to the framework of 
bsinking as a multiproduct industry. Brucker's main hypothesis 
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is that a microeconomic theory of the bank as a firm can be 
used to generate meaningful measures of monopoly power. Under 
consideration of profit maximization, Brucker views the elas­
ticity measure as an indicator of bank performance. He 
believes that the calculated elasticity of total loan demand 
is a weighted average of the underlying elasticities of the 
different components of the loan portfolio, the weights being 
given by the dollar volume of each type of loan. It follows 
that variations in the loan mix can affect the total loan 
elasticity estimate to the extent that different subelasticities 
are given different weights. Brucker then attempts to identify 
the key structural variables thought to be related systemat­
ically to the elasticity estimate. 
Having set the framework, Brucker compares his elasticity 
measure of monopoly to that of the loan-to-asset measure of 
bank performance. The equations used for the comparison are: 
Loan Elasticity = constant + aiXi + a^ Xg + 8.3X3 + 
84X4 (2.2) 
Loan-to-Asset Ratio = constant + biXi + bgXg + bgXs + 
b4X4 + bsXs (2.5) 
where 
Xi = number of savings and loan associations for each 
market 
X2 = number of banks 
X3 = percent of total banking assets held by the three 
largest banks 
X4 = population per bank 
18 
Xs = average asset size within the market 
Brucker concludes that to the extent the concentration 
ratio is a good measure of market structure, an unpredicted 
positive correlation in equation 2.3 tends to suggest that the 
loan-to-asset measure is not closely related to market struc­
ture. On the other hand, he notes that the relationship 
"between the elasticity measure and the concentration ratio is 
as predicted. He concludes that based on this and other 
closely related information, the elasticity measure is a 
superior gauge of monopoly power. 
Brucker's work was an attempt to demonstrate an alterna­
tive procedure for judging market cong)etition for the 
commercial "banking industry. Conceptually it was a move in 
the right direction for understanding banking competition as 
it relates to a host of product markets. Practically speaking, 
however, it is of dubious value. Though Brucker recognizes 
the need for distinguishing the possible differences in loan 
portfolios, he uses only the average revenue from the banks' 
total portfolios in computing the elasticities. Though he 
does include a ratio of loan portfolios in his regression (not 
in the calculated elasticity) these measures are too crude and 
questionable to necessarily represent an accurate portfolio 
allocation. 
It is apparent that approaching the question of competi­
tion as it relates to commercial banking activities is not 
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easily acconçjlished within a single industry concept. Being 
unable to allow for each type of banking service as it affects 
the banks' overall competitive position, tends to obscure the 
analysis and confound the conclusions. Furthermore, the 
current expansion of banks and bank holding companies into new 
product markets accents even more deliberately the shortcomings 
of these types of studies. The industry approach just does 
not permit an accurate evaluation of the commercial banks' 
competitive position in the market place. An alternate 
approach is to determine the dimensions of competition among 
banks and between banks and other institutions on a product 
market basis. From such an approach one cannot immediately in­
fer the overall policy implications for commercial banking, 
but one may eventually learn enough about the individual pro­
duct market to be able to make an accurate evaluation'of bank 
competition in general= 
Competition: The Personal Loan Market 
Most observations made about con^ etition in the personal 
loan market have come about indirectly as a result of research 
examining related yet different questions. The evidence from 
this research has generally inferred that competition does 
exist and is important between banks, finance companies and 
credit unions. 
David Fand and Ronald Forbes (11) examined the effects 
of rate ceilings on the volume of per capita installment loans 
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in the small loan market. They found, somewhat to their sur-
prise, that the most significant factor influencing the loan 
volume of licensed lenders was competition from banks. 
The model that Fand and Forbes worked with took the 
functional form; 
TL ^  
^ = f (finance charge, per capita income, (2.4) 
per capita liquid assets, and other 
variables) 
XL ^  = f (finance charge, ceiling rates, risk, (2.5) 
P bank participation, and other variables) 
d. — s 
where JL and ^ are, respectively, quantity of install-
P P 
ment loans demanded and quantity of installment loans supplied. 
Demand and supply were assumed inelastic with respect to the 
finance charge. This was necessitated by a lack of available 
data on finance charges, which forced its absence from the re­
gression equation. Only one demand variable, per capita income 
and three supply variables measuring risk, rate ceilings, and 
commercial bank participation were included in the final re­
gression. 
Fand and Forbes noted that the only significant relations 
were between the bank participation variables and quantity of 
loans in the supply demand equation, and between per capita 
income and quantity of loans in the demand equation. Not find­
ing any clear association among ceiling rates, loan loss ratios, 
and amounts outstanding, they concluded that the explanatory 
power of ceiling rates alone are limited. Observing that the 
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bank participation variables are significant, they then suggest 
that commercial banks play an important role in the consumer 
credit market. 
Anticipating questions of identification, Fand and Forbes 
acknowledge that in principle one cannot distinguish between 
supply- and demand-determining parameters on the basis of quan­
tity of data alone. They contend nevertheless that there is 
a theoretical basis for treating the bank participation vari­
able as a determinant of supply. What this theoretical 
justification is they are not completely clear about except 
to imply that the increased numbers of loans made by banks 
force finance companies to extend their loan volume. 
The upshot of the Fand-Forbes study is that while it does 
not deal specifically with the direct conç)etitive framework of 
installment credit lending, it definitely indicates that such 
conçjetition exists. 
In a follow-up to the Fand-Forbes study, Robert Shay ( 2 5 )  
also finds indirect evidence that banks and licensed lenders 
compete for small loans. Shay contends that the Fand-Forbes 
conclusion stating bank participation and per capita income to 
be more important than rate ceilings and risks in determining 
installment loans oustsmding is not necessarily substantiated 
by their results. Shay asserts that the enactment of higher 
rate ceilings in small loan laws might expand the amount of 
installment credit. He contends further that higher rate 
ceilings could allow licensed lenders to serve a different 
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segment of the market. 
Using a modified, version of the Fand-Forbes models Shay 
re-examines the evidence. Shay's dependent variable is the 
average outstanding loans of licensed small loan outlets in 
thirty states. Other variables include: for supply, gross 
income divided by average end-of-year outstanding loans, loan-
size limit in dollar amounts, and number of bank offices 
divided by loan offices; for demand, median family income in 
dollar amounts, percent of family income less than 10,000 
dollars, and number of families. 
Shay found that there is, in fact, support for Fand and 
Forbes' conclusions. Legal rate ceilings and risk do appear 
to be less important than bank competition to the explanation 
of differences in outstanding loans under state small loan laws. 
But, as a final note, he cautions that there is no indication 
•whether borrowers who go to banks when banks are relatively 
abundant, do so because of differences in rate ceilings or 
because of convenience. 
Paul Smith (28) examined the impact of finance companies 
on banking policies. Smith's model tested the relationship of 
finance charges for loans in a bank's portfolio and the dis­
tribution of that portfolio to different structural variables 
in the market. These structural variables included legal 
ceilings on finance charges, population, and the number of 
finance company offices in the same market as the bank. 
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Smith found no significant relationship between the niimber 
of finance conçanies in the market and the interest rate on 
personal loans at banks. He did find, however, that the num­
ber of finance companies was related positively to the size of 
personal loans extended at banks. Also, there was found a 
negative relationship between the number of finance conipanies 
and the proportion of unsecured personal loans held by the 
banks. Such results. Smith concludes, do imply that competition 
is significant between commercial banks and finance companies. 
Though Smith's inferences implying a competitive relation­
ship between banks and finance companies are significant, the 
comparisons for these financial institutions remain limited. 
The regressions concern only the interest rates and loan dis­
tributions for banks and the influence that the number of 
finance companies have on bank decisions. Smith does not con­
sider differences in the overall pricing policies between 
banks and finance companies as an indication of competition. 
Smith, in other words, does not examine just how direct com­
petition is in the consumer loan market. 
Finally, a study by William Sartoris (2%), again concerned 
with the effects of regulation upon the consumer loan market, 
provides additional information on competition within this 
market. The model implemented by Sartoris regressed loan ser­
vice (dollar amount of loans outstanding per family) on 
(1) the maximum ceiling rates of 100 and 300 dollar loans; 
(2) the reciprocal of the loan size ceiling; (3) population 
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factor; and (4) amotint of credit union loans. 
Sartoris found that bank competition was not statistic ally-
significant as an influence on the volume of loans made by 
licensed lenders. On the other hand, the statistical impor­
tance of coefficients for loans made by ancillary lenders and 
credit unions does indicate some competitive relationship 
between these lenders and finance companies, Sartoris observed, 
however, that the influence of credit unions might be a 
response to rather than a cause for the level of services 
available. Thus, the dependency relations described in the 
regression equations may be misleading. 
The general conclusion of the studies reviewed here is 
that competition among commercial banks, finance companies, 
and credit unions is apparent in the market for installment 
loans. The information leading to such conclusions, however, 
is indirect and the result of or spin-off from other questions 
being asked about the nature of the market. The studies were 
principally concerned with the effects of different variables 
on the supply of credit and, particularly, with the effects 
of legal ceilings and bank activity on the supply of credit 
in the market. Direct evidence as to the competitive frame­
work of the personal loan market is conspicuously absent from 
the literature. 
This study, therefore, will attempt to provide a more 
specific insight into the nature of competition between banks 
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and finance companies and banks and credit unions in the market 
for personal loans. 
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CHAPTER III. A SUGGESTED MODEL FOR ANALYSIS 
If the market for personal loans is perfectly competitive, 
or "highly" competitive, one would expect to find interest 
rates at banks, finance companies, and credit unions to be 
equal. But instead, even casual observations indicate that 
rates at banks are consistently less than rates at finance com­
panies and that rates at credit unions are less than rates at 
banks. Indeed, such rate differences or rate spreads between 
these institutions indicate that they are not perfect competi­
tors. The rate spreads can provide, therefore, a useful for­
mat from which to examine the absence of competition (segmenta-
tation) in the personal loan market. For the purpose of this 
study, it is assumed that the greater and more consistently 
that rates differ between institutions in the personal loan 
market, the stronger the evidence that the market is somehow 
segmented. 
Although interest rate spreads provide evidence that the 
market is segmented, they do not by themselves identify those 
factors which cause the market segmentation. To illustrate 
how such factors might be identified, examine Figure 3.1. Here, 
supply and demand curves for commercial banks and finance com­
panies are on two diagrams having a common vertical axis. The 
horizontal axes run in both directions from the origin. For 
commercial banks it runs from left to right and for finance 
companies it begins at the origin moving right to left. Supply 
Interest Rate 
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Figure 3.1 Example of effects of changes in relative supply-demand relationships 
between commercial banks and finance companies.. 
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and demand for finance companies are reversed and it must "be 
remembered in reading them that the origin is to the right. 
Assume initially that perfect competition exists in the market 
and that supply S° and demand D° for each institution are in­
distinguishable from one another. The rate spread equals zero, 
(r° = r^  ). But now, assume loans at banks become absolutely 
less costly to make; supply shifts from to and the rate 
spread increases from zero to (r^  - r^ ), Further, since banks 
have the cost advantage, assume that commercial banks strive 
to differentiate their customers from those at banks in order 
to charge a rate sufficient.to maintain their normal (non-
economic) profits. Assume the demand curve at finance companies 
shifts to and the rate spread increases to (r^  - r^ ). The 
rate spread (r^  - r^ ) is the product of differences in supply 
and demand between banks and finance companies; and, the 
greater the spread, the greater must be the differences in 
supply and demand for the respective institutions. Therefore, 
by examining the variation of selected market variables between 
institutions to changes in their rate spread, it should be 
possible to id,entify those specific factors which must contrib­
ute to a .segmented,market. . 
The model to be developed in this chapter is based on two 
premises: first, that observed rate spreads in the market are 
an accurate indication that the market is segmented between 
lending institutions, and second, that the rate spreads are 
directly linked and may be explained by the relative supply 
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and demand conditions which exist in the market. It remains 
to formulate appropriate estimates of relative differences in 
supply and demand between institutions and to suggest their 
effect on interest rate spreads. Also variations in the market 
and legal structure which commercial banks, finance con^ anies, 
and credit unions operate within must be considered and allow­
ances made for their relative effects on rates. 
Since the investigation is concerned principally with the 
question of market differences between banks and other finan­
cial institutions, the discussion will deal first with the 
relationship between banks and finance companies and second, 
with the relationship between banks and credit unions. Finally, 
the model will be summarized in equation form and the appropri­
ate empirical analysis will be outlined. 
Market Segmentation: Commercial Banks and Finance Companies 
Market demand 
MDst borrowers of personal cash credit earn incomes be­
tween $6,000 and $15,000 (20, p. lo). But it is generally 
suspected that a qualitative difference does exist between bor­
rowers at commercial banks and" borrowers at finance companies. 
Consumer finance companies, because of their own preference 
and expertise in small loan lending, are traditionally associ­
ated with high risk customers who have lower incomes. On the 
other hand, commercial banks are generally associated with the 
less risky, higher income borrower. At the same time, lower 
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income borrowers usually see themselves as "taking what they 
can get" and, thus, are rather insensitive to interest rate 
levels; whereas, the higher income borrowers are better in­
formed and are able to more easily change lenders if the terms 
of trade are not to their liking (l8, p. 48; 26, p. 7). Such 
differences in the type of customer each institution serves 
and in the different market behavior pattern that the respec­
tive customers display are strong justifications for demand 
differing between banks and finance companies. 
Therefore, assuming banks and finance companies respond 
to different borrowing needs, the rate spread will depend on 
the relative distribution of income levels of individuals in 
the market. The higher the income level of borrowers in the 
market, the more able they are to choose lending institutions 
and the less the rate spread will be for banks and finance 
companies. The lower the income level of individuals in the 
market, the more likely that finance companies will provide a 
high risk loan at a higher charge relative to banks. In Fig­
ure 3.2, for example, assume that some distribution of borrow­
ers according to income level is given and the rate spread is 
(r° - r°). Assume next that this distribution changes and 
that the proportion of low income borrowers in the market in­
crease, If banks specialize in serving high income borrowers 
while finance companies respond to the demand of low income 
individuals, then this change will cause the demand curve for 
finance companies to increase relative to banks. Simultaneously, 
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Figure 3.2 Example of effect of changes in relative demand relationship between 
commercial banks and finance companies. 
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it will cause the demand for banks to decrease. The rate spread 
will also increase from (r° - r°) to (r^  - r^ ). Thus^  the rate 
spread will depend importantly on the actual distribution of 
these borrowers within the market if, in fact, the different len­
ders respond to the needs of different borrowers in the market. 
The variable chosen to represent demand differences is 
the calculated proportion of total family income in a market 
under $10,000. This figure is somewhat arbitrarily chosen as 
the median between $6,000 and $15,000 (the range of income for 
most borrowers of personal loans). Still, the larger the pro­
portion of income below $10,000 in the market, the greater will 
be the observed rate spread if banks attract the high 
income borrower and finance companies attract the low income 
borrower. 
Market supply 
The ability to separate borrowers in the market is a nec­
essary requisite to the existence of different rates between . 
banks and finance companies. But the reason for distinguishing 
between different borrowers and the reason for rates differing 
between lenders may be importantlj'- linked to the stnj.ctural and 
cost differences that exist between institutions. If this is 
correct, then the association of supply relationships to the 
rate spread is essential to the explanation of market seg­
mentation. 
Consider the possibility that commercial banks may be 
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supplying loans in the market which are tied strictly to de­
posits held with the bank. The banks' operating objective may 
be to maximize profits by offering e low cost, good return 
"customer service package." Finance companies are not struc­
tured to provide this unique type of service and they may be 
able to offer the same loan only at higher costs and higher 
rates than commercial banks. Therefore, regardless of the de­
mand or the distribution of borrowers in the market, for any 
single quantity of loans offered by each institution, minimum 
interest charges at finance companies will be greater than 
minimum charges at banks. 
Also, market segmentation may be encouraged because banks 
have an advantage in obtaining and using loanable funds. Com­
mercial banks may shift funds as needed within a broad invest­
ment portfolio while finance companies, by comparison, have a 
much more restricted portfolio. For example, banks may move 
loanable funds from commercial loans to installment loans while 
finance companies can choose only between installment loans of 
one kind or another. If the opportunity cost of extending 
personal loans decreases for banks (i.e., the rate spread be­
tween personal loans and commercial loans increase), then, as 
with any cost decrease, banks will offer more personal loans 
at the same rate. Since this particular flexibility is unique 
for banks, there is good reason to expect significant variation 
in relative quantity differences between institutions. But 
more importantly, if these or other cost considerations imply 
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that "banks and finance companires are unable to compete with 
one anothera then difference in supply would be related direct­
ly to observed rate spreads between them. 
To clarify this, examine Figure 3.3. Assume initially 
that cost and other supply conditions axe identical to both 
banks and finance conçanies, = S^ . Each group of firms, for 
whatever reasons, choose to serve different borrower needs and 
this is reflected in the rate spread, (r^  - r^ ). But now 
assume that it is absolutely more costly for finance companies 
than for banks to offer a given quantity of loans. Supply 
schedules shift to and S^ , and for any quantity of loans 
each might offer, different rates are charged. Demand given, 
the rate spread increases further to (r^  - r^ ). Thus, to the 
extent the market is segmented because of different supply 
conditions for banks and finance conçjanies, this segmentation 
will be reflected in the rate spread between each group of 
firms. 
The supply of credit for banks and finance companies is 
obviously dependent on a number of structural and cost con­
siderations, Each consideration may have a specific effect 
on relative supply conditions and on the ability of each in­
stitution to compete in the market. However, it is virtually 
impossible to obtain direct measures for these variables at 
the microeconomic level and, therefore, an alternative approach 
concerned only with examining the relationship of relative 
quantitites to rate spreads is suggested here. It assumes that 
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Figure 3.3 Example of effects of changes in relative demand relationship between 
commercial banks and finance companies. 
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quantity supplied in the market by each institution is unre­
sponsive to direct price changes. In this way the quantity 
of loans extended in the market is solely a supply phenomenon, 
which implicitly reflects the existing cost and nonprice de­
cision factors in the market. As support for this approach 
one may point to the controlled nature of most financial mar­
kets. Price competition and the quantity of loanable funds 
are directly controlled by the regulatory authorities. Inter­
est rates allowed to be paid on deposits held with commercial 
banks are subject to ceiling constraints, while interest rates 
in the open market are subject most importantly to government 
intervention. Since the quantity of loanable funds is re­
stricted in its ability to respond to the price signals, mar­
ket supply is price inelastic. If supply were perfectly 
inelastic, the quantity of loans extended would depend only 
on the supply curve. Though perfect inelasticity is not Ifcely, 
it is reasonable to assume that supply is sufficiently inelas­
tic to allow differences in quantity extended to primarily 
represent differences in supply conditions between banks and 
finance companies. 
Accordingly, relative supply conditions are estimated as 
the ratio of quantity of loans extended by banks to loans ex­
tended by finance companies. Demand given, the greater this 
ratio, the greater the volttme of bank loans compared to finance 
conç)any loans and the lower the rates at banks compared to fi­
nance company rates; conversely, the smaller the ratio. 
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the lower the rates will be at finance companies compared 
to banks. The quantity variables does not explicitly 
measure each cost factor affecting supply; nevertheless, 
gauging the relationship of relative quantity differences to 
the rate spread provides a useful vehicle to judge the extent 
of market segmentation associated with different supply con­
ditions for banks and finance companies. Further, by compar­
ing the importance of the quantity variable to other variables 
in the model, some insight can be gained into determining 
from which side of the market the impetus for the rate spread 
comes. 
Market structure 
Concentration Structural•imperfections may dramat­
ically effect the price actions of different institutions in 
the market for personal loans. Unless perfect competition 
exists, there is always the possibility that the firms in the 
market can and will strive to control the terms of trade. A 
question to be dealt with then is to what extent observed rates 
in the market reflect the influence of monopolistic price 
actions. 
To demonstrate how monopolistic price action might effect 
the rate spread, examine Figure 3.%. Maximum funds to be 
loaned out are and and marginal cost (MC) sharply in­
creases at these quantity levels. Assume that banks and fi­
nance companies operate in a segmented market neither competing 
Interest Rate 
MR 
0 
Quantity of Loans ($) Quantity Of Loans (^) 
Finance Companies Commercial Banks 
Figure 3 A Example of effects of monopoly versus competitive market conditions 
on rates for personal loans. 
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with the other. Assume, also, that finance companies operate 
as perfect competitors. The interest rate at finance companies 
is r^  and each firm must offer all its available quantity if 
it wishes to maximize profits. For commercial banks, it is 
assumed that the market structure is monopolistic. Because the 
banks have some degree of control over price and output, quan­
tity offered is less than funds available and the interest rate 
is r^  (which is greater than the competitive rate r^ ), The 
effect of banks having the monopoly power has been to decrease 
the rate spread from (r^  - r^ ) to (r^  - rg ). 
The above exan^ le demonstrates not only how a monopolist 
market structure might work, but also why it is important to 
identify its influence on rate spreads. By identifying this 
particular influence, one avoids the possibility of misinter­
preting some movements in rate spreads as being associated 
with changes in relative market supply and demand conditions 
between institutions, when they are more correctly the result 
of changes in relative market structures within which the in­
stitutions operate. As Figure 3.4 shows, a decline in the 
spread may represent more accurately an increase in monopolis­
tic behavior among banks, then a decrease in supply and demand 
differences between banks and finance con^ anies thought to be 
associated with increased competition. 
The above example also reflects the hypothesis that banks 
are generally in the best position to act as monopolist in the 
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market. Entry into the market place is considerably less dii'i'i-
cult for finance companies than it is for commercial banks. 
Thow;h mont ntatc laws require finance companies to be licensed 
and many of the laws have a "needs and convenience" clause 
which restricts entry, it is still much easier to acquire a 
consumer finance license than to acquire a bank charter (20, 
p. 31). Moreover, as compared to finance companies, commercial 
banks are commonly larger and have greater control of finan­
cial resources on which to base a monopolistic market position. 
Thus, if monopoly power in the market does play an important 
role in determining rate levels, it is expected that commercial 
banks will be in the best position to increase its rates rela­
tive to finance companies. 
The variable designed to measure monopoly power available 
to firms in a market is the concentration ratio. This ratio 
reflects the relative share of total output of the leading 
firms in the market; and, it is usually computed as the market 
share of the four largest firms. The greater the ratio, the 
greater the likelihood that monopoly price behavior will occur 
in the market. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that 
the greater the level of concentration in the market, the more 
likely that commercial bank rates will increase relative to 
rates at finance companies. 
Branch banking In markets where banks may branch 
there is generally an increased emphasis in retail banking 
which may include a stronger emphasis in personal lending (15). 
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This in turn may imply an increased awareness by banks and 
finance couqpanies of each other's actions in the personal loan 
market. If so, for any income distribution of borrowers or 
relative quantity of loans extended by lenders, the rate spread 
will be less in markets where branching is permitted as com­
pared to nonbranching markets. 
The effect of branch banking on rate spreads may be noted 
in the analysis by the introduction of a dummy variable. A 
"1" is entered as an observation in those markets where branch 
banking is permitted and an "O" is entered as an observation in 
those markets where it is not permitted. If branch banking 
is in^ ortantly associated with a decrease in the rate spread, 
then its estimated coefficient will be significantly less than 
zero (i.e., significantly less than rate spreads in nonbranch­
ing markets). 
Legal restrictions and consuxaer lending 
The National Commission on Cons-umer Finance noted recently 
...when the ceiling applicable to a given type of credit 
for one class of lender is substantially below that for 
another class of lender, the former class will be forced 
to serve mainly low risk borrowers j the latter, high 
ceiling class will tend to serve relatively high risk 
borrowers. Tiiis artificial segmentation of the market 
obviously restricts interinstitutional rivalry (20, p. 50). 
Indeed, state laws limiting the maximum rate of charge on loans 
can segment the personal loan market. However, the mere im­
position of different ceiling rates on banks and finance com­
panies does not necessarily imply a segmented market, not 
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unless the ceiling rates are imposed below the free market 
rates that would otherwise exist. Thus, it is intuitively 
apparent that rate ceilings can play a role in segmenting the 
market but whether this factor is actually important remains 
to be determined. 
The impact that legal ceiling may have on market rates 
is demonstrated in Figure 3.5. Simply, if both banks and fi­
nance companies are restricted in their price actions by legal 
ceilings and these ceilings are below market equilibrium inter­
est rates that would otherwise exist, then the differences in 
observed rates in the market will be the same as permissible 
rates, in Figure 3.5 - r. ) would be the observed 
max max 
rate spread. Had the market been left to its own determination, 
the spread would have been (r^  - r^ ), A similar situation 
exists if finance companies are restricted in their price 
actions but commercial banks are not. In Figure 3,5. the dif­
ference in the observed market rate would be seen as (r„ 
max 
r^ ) rather than (r^  - r^ ), Once again the effect of legal 
restrictions on interest rates would vary with actual rates 
charged in the market. 
Of course it is possible that the legal ceilings for dif­
ferent institutions coincide rather closely with rates of 
interest that would otherwise exist in the absence of such 
ceilings. In this situation the variable representing the in­
fluence of legal ceilings would appear to be significant even 
though its actual importance is doubtful. It is, however. 
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Figure 3.5 Example of effects of maximum allowable interest rates on personal 
loans. 
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unlikely that for a large number of market situations such a 
phenomenon would be consistently apparent in the analysis, it 
is assumed^  therefore, that a significant relationship between 
market rates and legal rate, ceilings implies that such ceil­
ings have an important role in separating the personal loan 
market between commercial banks and finance companies. 
Market Segmentation: Commercial Banks and Credit Unions 
Much of the discussion to follow is analogous to that 
just considered for finance conq)anies and banks. Consequently, 
it will be simplified and omit the graphical enumerations and 
examples. 
Market demand 
One major prerequisite for borrowing money from a credit 
union is that the customer be a member of the association. As 
the very ability to belong to the union is based on a common 
bond - usually employment - the risk of a credit union loan is 
probably no greater than that associated with a loan granted by 
a commercial bank. Unlike the bank-finance company relation­
ship, risk is not a differentiating factor for banks and credit 
unions and differences in relative income levels in the market 
will not serve to identify differences in demand between these 
institutions. Still, because credit unions are mutual organi­
zations with membership restrictions, borrowers are not going 
to be perfectly mobile between banks and credit unions. Rate 
variations between these two institutions based on differences 
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in relative demand may still exist.^  
Under perfect competition the market demand curve is de­
rived by summing horizontally all individuals' demand curves. 
Once market supply and demand is derived, then price is deter­
mined and each firm accepts the market price as the only 
applicable price to be used in making its various operating 
decisions. Because borrowers are assumed to be perfectly 
mobile between lenders this conclusion follows whether banks 
service 50 percent or 8o percent of total market demand. If, 
on the other hand, borrowers are not perfectly mobile between 
commercial banks and credit unions, then the price may vary as 
differences occur in each group of firms' relative demand 
curve. That is, differences in the horizontal summation of 
demand curves of individuals confined to each type of insti­
tution may exist. Accordingly, interest rates may differ 
between these institutions 
The difference in the location of the demand curve of 
commercial banks relative to credit unions may be approximated 
by the ratio of the number of bank facilities to the number 
of credit unions in a market. ' The greater the number of banks 
as compared to credit unions, then the higher the likelihood 
S^ee Gary G, Gilbert and W. A. Longbrake (15). In this 
study it was pointed out that some demand relationships depend 
on the type of customer (as with banks and finance companies) 
while others depend more on the relative number of customers 
(more likely the appropriate relationship between banks and 
credit unions). 
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that the market demand curve for banks will be greater rela­
tive to the demand at credit unions. Assuming borrowers are 
not perfectly mobile between banks and credit unions, the 
larger this ratio, the higher that the rates charged by com­
mercial banks may be relative to credit unions; the smaller 
the ratio, the lower the rate at credit unions relative to 
banks. 
Market supply 
As with the bank-finance company relationship, supply is 
assumed to be unresponsive to price changes and the quantity 
of loans extended by credit unions is assumed to be a direct 
reflection of their market supply curve. If the market is 
segmented according to differences in the supply structure for 
banks and credit unions, then such differences will be reflect­
ed in the observed rate spreads between them. Therefore, it 
is assumed that the greater the ratio of loans by banks rela­
tive to loans by credit unions the lower the rate at banks 
relative to rates at credit unions and likewise, the smaller 
the ratio the greater the rates at banks as compared to credit 
unions. 
Market structure and legal constraints 
The effects of monopoly behavior in the market will again 
be measured by the concentration ratio. Being nonprofit organ­
izations by definition, however, credit unions will not be _ 
associated with monopoly price behavior. Rational behavior 
does not bind them to marginal cost equal marginal revenue 
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actions. Despite market entry barriers or relative market 
shares of the largest firms^  credit unions will not act to 
collect ^ 'pure" (economic) profit. Under this interpretation 
monopoly behavior will only be observed in the actions of 
banks as compared to credit uiions. Therefore, assuming that 
credit unions charge a lower interest rate than banks, an 
increase in the concentration ratio will be associated with 
an increase in the rate spread, as commercial banks raise 
their interest rates relative to credit unions. 
Next, if the introduction of branching into a market has 
the unique effect of increasing the awareness of banks and 
credit unions to each other's actions in the market, then con­
sistently smaller rate spreads will be observed in these mar­
kets than in markets where branching is not prevalent. To 
allow for this possible effect, a dummy variable is again 
introduced into the model: a "1" representing those markets 
where branching is permitted and an "o" where it is not 
permitted. 
Finally, credit unions as well as finance companies and 
banks are subject to rate ceilings. The ceilings in^ osed on 
credit unions tend to be lower than comparable ceilings for 
for banks. Here again the effect on observed spreads between 
credit unions and banks is analogous to that for finance com­
panies and banks. If credit unions and banks are charging the 
maximum rates allowed by law, then the difference in rates 
allowed by law and observed rates in the market should be 
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directly associated with one another. The stronger the rela­
tionship, the greater the evidence the legal constraints are 
major factors segmenting the market. 
The Testable Model 
For a given loan size, the performance variables measur­
ing the degree of market segmentation between commercial banks 
and finance companies and commercial banks and credit unions 
are, respectively; 
where r_ = interest rate on personal loans made by finance 
companies 
r, = interest rates on personal loans made by commercial 
banks 
r = interest rates on personal loans made by credit 
unions 
Note that for Si, interest rates at commercial banks are 
subtracted from rates at finance companies and for Sg, credit 
union rates are subtracted from bank rates. This is done to 
keep the sign of the performance variable positive under the 
general observation that finance companies charge higher rates 
than banks and banks charge higher rates than credit unions. 
In accordance with these assumptions the analysis first tests 
the hypotheses that: 
Si = 0 versus Si > o 
Sg = 0 versus S2>0 
k9 
Assuming that both null hypotheses are rejected, then the 
discussion of this chapter is designed to explain the nature 
of the observed segmentation and can be explained in the fol-
• lowing two equations. They are: 
Sii = a^  + aiBii + agY^  + agQi^  + a^ Mi^  + agLi^  3«2 
Ssi = bo + biBai + bgD^ + bgQ^^ + b^M^^ + ^sLsi 3*3 
where i = i^  ^market 
Y = proportion of total family income in the market 
below $10^ 000 
D = ratio of commercial banks relative to credit unions 
Qi = ratio of personal loans extended by commercial banks 
and finance companies 
Qs = ratio of personal loans extended by commercial banks 
and credit unions 
Ml = concentration ratio: market share of four largest 
commercial banks and/or finance con^ anies in the 
market 
Ms = concentration ratio: market share of four largest 
commercial banks 
Bi = dummy variable: equal to 1 when branch banking is 
permitted in a market area; 0 otherwise. Estimates 
effect of branch, banking on the"finance company-
commercial bank price spread 
Bs = dummy variable: equal to 1 when branch banking is 
permitted in a market area; 0 otherwise. Estimates 
effect of branch banking on the credit union-commer­
cial bank price spread 
Li = difference in legal rate ceilings between commercial 
banks and finance companies 
Ls = difference in legal rate ceilings between commercial 
banks ^ d credit unions 
Assuming that the rates at finance companies are greater 
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than rates at banks^  the following signs are hypothesized for 
those variables in equation 3.2 thought to be influencing the 
spread: 
ai< 0 If branch banking has the effect of decreasing 
market segmentation, the branching coefficient 
will be associated with consistently smaller 
rate spreads, 
a2>0 The greater the percentage of lew income families 
in the market, the greater the demand for high 
risk loans and the greater the possible special­
ization by type of borrower for banks and finance 
companies and the greater the rate spread. 
as > 0 The greater the ratio of loans madp by banks 
relative to finance compainies, the lower the 
rates of banks as compared to finance companies 
and the greater the rate spread. 
a4<0 The greater market concentration dominated by 
banks, the higher bank rates will be relative to 
finance companies and the smaller will be the 
rate spread, 
a5>0 Assuming rate ceilings are set below free market 
rates, the greater that ceiling differences are 
then the greater observed rate differences will 
be. 
Assuming that the rates at credit unions are less than 
rates at banks, the following signs are hypothesized for those 
variables in equation ^ .3 thought to be effecting the spread, 
bi<0 If branch banking has the effect of decreasing 
market segmentation then the branch banking 
coefficient will be associated with consistently 
smaller rate spreads, 
b2>0 If borrowers are not perfectly mobile among 
lenders, then the greater the ratio of banks to 
credit unions the greater the possible demand at 
banks relative to credit unions and the greater 
the price spread 
5.1 
b3<0 The less the ratio of loans made by banks rela­
tive to credit imions the greater the rate spread. 
b4>0 The greater the concentration ratio for banks, 
the greater their rates will be relative to cred­
it unions and the greater the rate spread. 
bs>0 Assuming rate ceilings are set below free market 
rates, the greater ceiling differences are then 
the greater observed rate differences will be. 
Since the objective of equations 3.2 and 3.3 is to identi­
fy those variables most associated with the rate spread,.each 
coefficient will be tested as to its relative significance in 
the analyses. The testable hypotheses are; 
a^  = 0 versus a^ >0, i = 2, 3, 4, 5 
a^  = 0 versus a^ < 0, i = 1,4 
b^  = 0 versus b^ >0, i = 2, 4, 5 
b^  = 0 versus b^ <0, i = 1, 3 
Having set the framework of analysis, it remains to exam­
ine the model empirically. Hopefully, some specific insist 
into the degree and meaning of frequently observed rate dif­
ferences for the product personal loans can be obtained. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Nature of the Data 
The personal loan market is local by nature, usually in­
volving the boundaries of a city or town. Because of the need 
to keep the data consistent and because of the limited sources 
of data, it was necessary to define the market and collect the 
data with respect to state boundaries. Though state boundaries 
are political and not economic entities, they are the smallest 
unit for which consistent data was available. 
Information was "collected from all fifty states . for 1971. 
Interest rate data (rj (in annual percentage rates)^  quantity 
of loan data ( Q,), and concentration data (M) were obtained from 
à 1971 survey study by the.National Commission on Consumer Fi­
nance (21). Population and income data (Y) were obtained from 
census information (30). Branch banking data (B), number of 
banks and number of credit unions (D) were obtained from F.D.I. 
C. reports and the National Credit Union Association (13, 8). 
Maximum allowable rates (L) (in annual percentage rates) were 
obtained from information provided by the Financial Publishing 
Company of Boston (l4). From commercial banks, interest rate 
data was available and loans assumed to average ^ 500 and 
$1000. No stratified data was available for finance companies 
and credit unions. 
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The average size of loans extended by each institution 
was calculated for each state. If the banks in a state had 
am average loan size of $750 or less, then the average interest 
rate for the $500 loan category was assigned as the represent­
ative market rate. On loans over $750, the average market rate 
for the $1000 loan category was assigned as the representative 
market rate. For finance con^ anies and credit unions only one 
observation was available and it was assigned as the appropri­
ate interest rate for the observed average loan size. 
Finally, in calculating the maximum allowable rates on 
personal loans (L) an average repayment period of 18 months 
was assumed. In annual percentage rate terms the difference 
in maximum permissible rates for 12, 18, and 24 month periods 
is not great (e.g., the difference involves less than .25 of 
a percentage point). Since these are the most common repay­
ment schedules on personal loans, the IS month rates are , 
assumed to accurately represent maximum permissible rates. 
Market Segmentation: Commercial Banks and Finance Companies 
The first concern of the model described in Chapter III 
is the significance of the rate spreads between banks and fi­
nance companies. Accordingly, in Table 4.1 the average spread 
in interest rates between banks and finance companies for the 
fifty state observations, is listed and it is equal to 12.9 per­
centage points. Employing a paired comparison analysis this 
figure was concluded to be significantly different from zero 
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at the 1 percent level. Given that interest rates are measured 
in hundredths (.00) of a percentage point, the spread of over 
12 points is impressive evidence that banks and finance com­
panies are not direct competitors. Moreover, it was observed 
that the quantity of personal loans extended by finance com­
panies was greater than quantities extended by banks in 39 
of 50 states; and in 50 of 50,states, the interest rate at fi­
nance companies was greater than the rate at banks, it follows 
that where both the quantity and price of loans extended by 
finance companies are greater than those of commercial banks, 
these two institutions must operate to a large extent indepen­
dently of one another. 
Table 4.1 Average rate spread for banks and finance companies 
in percentage points 
Si 
Average rate spread for all 12,92»®" 
fifty state observations (.633) 
The value in parentheses is the standard deviation. The 
Duperscript («) indicates the spread Si to be significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
To examine the relationship of rate spreads to changes in 
selected market variables, the model defined under equation 3,2 
was fitted to the data for all fifty states. The results are 
presented in Table 4.2, row 1. 
Table 4,2 Interest rate spreads for "banks and flneince compan­
ies regressed on selected market variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Row Si Constant Bi Y 
a 
Rate spread for 7.2706* -.4622 2.56l4 
all fifty state (3.4410) (1.0430) (4.9627) 
observations 
Rate spread for 13.6912** .5394 -3.314 
the twenty-five (7.6270) (1.5930) (10.0238) 
states with the 
smallest loan 
size 
Rate spread for -.7048 -.2460 15.5437** 
the twenty-five (5.27II) (1.58(77) (9.7044) 
states with the 
largest loan size 
a 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript (») indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while (**) indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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QI • ML LI R' 
-1.1086 -.0943!^^ .6016 .5756 
(.9137) (.0643) (.0952) 
-2.1844**^ -.1728*^ .5280*^ .6264 
(1.4744) (.1062) (.1366) 
.4280 -.0878 .6113*^ .5682 
(1.1939) (.0878) (.1756) 
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Legal rate ceilings clearly explain the majority of vari­
ation in rate spreads and is significant at the 1 percent level. 
The quantity variable, Qi, carries a negative rather than pre­
dicted positive coefficiento This implies that as banks in­
crease quantity relative to finance companies, markets tend 
to become less segmented. This might suggest further that as 
commercial banks become more involved in the personal loan 
market the supply structure is changing, actually becoming 
more like that of finance companies. Thus, the rate spread 
would decline. The negative coefficient is not significant 
but the "t" value is greater than one and the implication for 
decreased segmentation in the market should not be ignored. 
The concentration ratio is negative and significant at 
the 10 percent level. This negative coefficient suggests 
that part of the decrease in spread does not imply a decrease 
in segmentation but, rather, implies some degree of monopolis­
tic price action on the part of banks. 
The regression results for the 50 state observations do 
provide some useful information into the nature of observed 
market segmentation. But it neglects one important aspect of 
the loan product, which xs the different costs associated with 
loans of different sizes. It is known that the smaller the 
average size of the loan, the greater the cost of processing 
the loan (19, 2). The size of the loan, therefore, may 
differentiate the product for both borrowers and lenders, if 
this is correct, the legal and market variables might affect 
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the rate spread quite differently as the size of the loan 
changes. 
To examine the influence that loan size might have on rate 
spreads and their relationship to selected market variables, 
the fifty observations were divided in half according to the 
average size of personal loans made by commercial banks. Of 
course, for individual states the average size of loans for 
banks, finance companies and credit unions are not identical. 
But in states where loans are small for banks they tended 
also to be small for other institutions. For example, in the 
25 states with the smallest sized loans, the average personal 
loan for banks was $716 and for finance companies and credit 
unions it was $761 and $866, In the 25 states with the largest 
loans these figures were $1,091, $860 and $914, respectively. 
The average rate spread for the 25 states with the small­
est loans is 13.91 points and for the 25 states with larger 
sized loans it is 11.93 points. These spreads are significant­
ly different from zero at the 1 percent level. (See Table 4,3 
below). Further, the difference between the mean spreads for 
large states versus small states is equal to 1.90 points (13.9I-
11,93) and is significantly different from zero at the 10 per­
cent level,^  Thus, the initial conclusion is that the loan 
size does differentiate the product, 
Igee Appendix II for analysis of variance tables and com­
parison tests between mean rate spreads for different loan 
sizes. 
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Table 4.3 Average rate spread for banks and finance companies 
for selected loan sizes 
Row Sx 
1 Average rate spread for the 
twenty-five states with the 
smallest loan sizes 
13.91*^  
(.9921) 
a 
2 Average spread for the twenty-
five states with the largest 
loan sizes 
11.93* 
(.7518) 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
fi-'iporsoript (•») indicates the spread Si to 'te significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Next, the spread for each of the loan size categories were 
fitted to the selected market variables in equation 3.2 and the 
results are presented in Table 4.2, rows 2 and 3. Before in­
ferences were made based on these results, however, the data 
for the fifty states were again divided, this time into quar-
tiles. This was done to check the consistency of''the results 
under a finer breakdown of loan sizes. The mean rate spreads 
for each of four loan categories are listed in Table 4.4. The 
regression results are presented in Table 4^ 5^  
It may be generally stated that the regression results 
are consistent for each grouping of data. But more specifically 
in Table 4.2, row 2 and Table 4.5, rows 1 and 2, where loan 
sizes are smaller, the income variable Y is not significant. 
It is not apparent that each institution specializes in making 
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Table 4,4 Average rate spread for banks and finance companies 
for selected loan sizes in percentage points 
Row Si 
1 Average spread 
of states with 
size 
for first quarter 
the smallest loan 
14.740** 
(1.637) 
2 Average spread 
of states with 
size 
for second quarter 
next smallest loan 
13.017* 
(1.049) 
3 Average spread for third quarter 
of states with next largest loan 
size 
13.162* 
(1.205) 
4 Average spread 
of states with 
size 
for last quarter 
largest loan 
10.796** 
(.8543) 
a 
The values in parenthesis are standard deviations. The 
superscript (*) indicates the spread Si to be significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
loans to different types of borrowers in this smaller loan 
category. Also, for this category of loans, the quantity vari­
able carries a negative sign and it is significant at the 10 
percent level in Table 4.2, row 2. Thus, as the quantity of 
loans extended by commercial banks increase relative to finance 
companies, the rate spread decreases rather than increases as 
predicted. On the other hand, in those states considered to 
have the largest loan sizes (Table 4,2, row 3 and Table 4.5, 
rows 3 and 4) the quantity variable has the predicted positive 
Table 4,5 Interest rate spreads for banks and finance compan­
ies regressed on selected market variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Row Si Constant Bi 
Rate spread for 8.8^ 95 2,793 -5.0152 
first quarter of (I8.6358) (50.2868) (4.7417) 
states with 
smallest loan size 
a 
Rate spread for 23.2767** I.0807 16.2939 
second quarter of (13.1950) (3.1244) (I6.II95) 
states with next 
smallest loan size 
Rate spread for -4.2662 I.8619 14.6325 
third quarter of (11.3727) (2.7182) (16.8970) 
states with next 
largest loan size 
Rate spread for -1.849 -1.744 26,9985 ** 
last quarter of (9.4547) (2.551%) (17.3854) 
states with 
largest loan size 
a 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript (*) indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while (**) indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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QI ML LI R' 
-5.0152 -.0407 .6019*^ .7739 
(4.7417) (.1822) (.1951) 
-1.6418 -.4410** ^ .6367**^  .4405 
(1.9794) (.3102) (.4292) 
a 
.8014 -.0507 .7852* .7475 
(4.2209) (.1321) (.3078) 
1.2066 
(1.4658) 
-.1881 
(.1516) 
.4211 
(.3313) 
.5463 
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sign. The income variable carries the sign predicted under 
the assunmtion that each institution serves a different type 
of borrower. Alsoj the income variable is significant at the 
10 percent level for the largest 25 loan size states in Table 
4,2 and the largest quarter of states in Table 4.5. In states 
where loans are large, it appears that banks specialize in 
serving the needs of the higher-income, better-risk customers 
and that finance companies remain with the high-risk borrowers. 
In smaller loan size states supply and demand variables 
do not contribute much'to the explanation df variation in ob­
served rate spreads; whereas, in states with larger loans, 
these same variables carry the hypothesized signs and are 
clearly more significant in explaining observed rate differences. 
One might conclude, therefore, that market segmentation between 
institutions is of less concern in states where loans are 
smaller than where they are larger. But it is essential that 
the coefficients not be construed in this manner. Recall that 
where the data was divided into the 25 smallest and 25 largest 
loan size states, the average spread between banks and finance 
companies for small loans is 13.9 percentage points, while 
for larger loans, the spread is 11.9 points. The difference 
between these mean spreads of I.98 percentage points is sig­
nificant at the 10 percent level. Further, where the data 
were divided into quartiles by loan size the spreads«also de­
clined as loan size increased. Though in this latter instance 
the difference between spread means were not significant, they 
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were, in fact, nearly significant .at the 10 percent level..^ (See 
Appendix II, Table A2.2). Thus, market segmentation is more evi­
dent in small loan-size states than in large loan-size states. 
In both types of markets,, but more so 'iTï the smaller^  loan-
size markets, it is the difference in ceilings that explains 
the greatest amount of variation in rate spreads. It is 
suggested that in larger loan markets, banks can operate pro­
fitably under low interest rate constraints because costs 
tend to be less. As barriers to entry into the market are 
lower, the degree of market segmentation between banks and 
finance companies for a broader range of borrowers is-less. 
Therefore, the rate spreads, in general, are less in these 
markets than in markets where loan size is smaller. Still, 
as the significance of the income variable for states with 
larger loans indicates, the effects of the legal ceilings and 
preferences of the lenders involved continue to encourage each 
institution to confine their lending activities to different 
groups of borrowers. 
In states where loans tend to be smaller the quantity 
variable does carry a negative sign and is significant at the 
10 percent level. But this is probably because the effects of 
rate ceilings combined with the smaller loan sizes have a more 
restrictive effect in these markets. Indeed, the legal vari­
able is consistently more significant for the smaller loan-
size states. The higher costs associated with smaller loans 
require a higher rate of charge to attract lenders. Banks, 
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with lower rate ceilings than finance conçanies, tend to remain 
on the perimeter of this market segment. Where they do enter, 
it is likely that at least part of the decision to enter is 
because higher gross earnings are possible under relatively 
higher rate ceilings. The rate spread decreases because 
banks may charge higher rates. Also, higher income borrowers 
usually do not have a demand for a small, high-cost loan. In­
creased activities by banks in these markets are most likely 
directed to a lower income borrower. Therefore, the increased 
activities by banks stimulate interinatitutional competition 
and the rate spread declines. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that in both large and 
small states references made to decreases in the rate spread 
must be viewed only marginally. Though the effect of increased 
loan size or the effect of increased bank activity in small 
loein markets may tend to decrease rate spreads, this does not 
imply that the market suddenly becomes competitive between 
banks and finance companies. The rate ceiling differences are. 
far too dominant and far too great for the market to be general­
ly categorized as competitive. For example, in Table 4.4, even 
in the quarter of states with the largest loan sizes a spread 
of 10 points implies a considerable absence of competition 
between different borrowers and different lenders in the mar­
ket. 
The monopoly variable also explains some of the variation 
in rate spreads. As hypothesized, the negative sign of the 
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coefficient for M in Table 4.2 and 4.5 would indicate that as 
concentration increases, banks raise interest charges toward 
the ceiling rates. But notice further in Table 4.2, rows 2 
and that as the size of the loan increases, encouraging in­
creased participation by all institutions capable of making 
personal loans, the monopoly variable becomes insignificant. 
The inference is, therefore, that artificial price barriers 
encourage monopolistic pricing behavior and as the size of the 
loan increases reducing the importance of the barriers, such 
monopolistic activities decrease. 
It is not surprising to find the dummy variable for branch 
banking to be unimportant in the regression results. The ex­
tent of market segmentation and the dominance of rate ceilings 
implies that interinstitutional competition is small. Addition­
al bank facilities in a market may imply greater intrainstitu-
tional competition but it does not imply a significantly 
greater likelihood of price competition being carried on be­
tween banks and finance companies. 
Briefly stated, rate differences between finance companies 
and banks are large and the market is clearly segmented between 
them. This segmentation is due principally to the different 
pricing constraints under which each institution is forced to 
operate. There is some small evidence that regardless of the 
pricing constraint^  segmentation would remain as each institu­
tion chooses to serve a different type of borrower. Weighing 
against this observation is evidence from the supply side 
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suggesting that as bsinks increase their activities in the per­
sonal loan market5 segmentation does become less severe. 
Nevertheless J under present ceiling constraints, the mechanics 
of market interaction cannot eliminate observed segmentation 
in the sense that the rate spread becomes zero. 
Market Segmentation: Commercial Banks and Credit Unions 
The method of analysis for banks and credit unions was 
conducted nearly identically to that for banks and finance 
companies. Average interest rate spreads were computed for 
all fifty states, for the 25 smallest and 25 largest loan size 
states, and for the states divided into quarters based on loan 
size. These calculations are presented in Tables 4.6 through 
4.8 below. It is most important that one keep in mind when 
considering the relationships between banks and credit unions 
that the rate spread is defined as the interest rate at banks 
minus the interest rate at credit unions. This is exactly 
the reverse of the defined term for banks and finance companies 
and the interpretation of some of the reactions of rate spreads 
to changes in market variable will be effected accordingly. 
The interest rate spread for commercial banks and credit 
unions are significantly different from zero. This suggests 
the market to be segmented, but the evidence is far less im­
pressive for banks and credit unions than it was for banks 
and finance companies. For example, in Tables 4,6 through 4.8 
the absolute rate spread for banks and credit unions average 
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Table 4.6 Average rate spread for banks and credit unions 
in percentage points 
Sg 
Average rate spread for all fifty 1.58 ** 
state observations (.3259) 
The value in parentheses is the standard deviation. The 
superscript ( *) indicates Sg to be significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level 
Table 4.7 Average rate spreads for banks and credit unions for 
selected loan sizes in percentage points 
Row 
Average rate spread for the 1.85 
twenty-five states with the (.5688) 
smallest loan sizes 
a 
Average rate spread for the 1.31* 
twenty-five states with the (.3118) 
largest loan sizes 
The values in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
The superscript (•) indicates the rate spread Sg to be signif­
icantly different from zero at the 1 percent level 
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Table 4.8 Average rate spread for banks and credit unions for 
selected loan sizes in percentage points 
Row Sa 
1 Average spread for first quarter 
of states with the smallest loan 
size 
1.376-»^  
(.5792) 
2 Average spread for second quarter 
of states with the next smallest 
loan size 
2.363 ** 
(1.020) 
3 Average spread for third quarter 
of states with next largest loan 
size 
1.064 
( .5230) 
4 Average spread for last quarter 
of states with largest loan size 
1.543 * 
(.3674) 
The values in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
The superscript (*) indicates the rate spread Sg to be sig­
nificantly different from zero at the 1 percent level 
less than 2 percentage points rather than the 10 to 14 found 
for banks and finance companies. Also, while banks are general­
ly subject to higher ceilings than credit unions, both banks 
and credit unions are subject to much lower ceilings than fi­
nance conqianies. Such common restrictions on banks and credit 
unions tend to pressure these lenders to vie for a lower risk 
borrower. These circumstances naturally put pressure on the 
market to become less segmented as measured by rate spreads, 
m accordance with equation regressions were run 
fitting the rate spreads to selected market variablesj the 
results are presented in Table 4,9 and 4.10. Where regressions 
Table 4,9 Interest rate spreads for banks and credit imions 
regressed on selected market variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Row Sz Constant Bg 
Rate spread for .7171 .0381 .0305 
all fifty state (I.0769) (.7681) (.5005) 
observations 
Rate spread for -.9633 -.5162 -8.3698 
the twenty-five (2.II57) (l.846l) (8,9676) 
states with the 
smallest loan size 
Rate spread for .6691 -,6766 5.0383 
the twenty-five (.8338) (.5561) (4.1736) 
states with the 
largest loan size 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript (*) indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while (*») indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Qs Ma Lg Rg 
.0054 .2553*^  .1452 .0102 
(.2630) (.0143) (.0967) 
a 
.a 
1.400** .0496 .3049* .2538 
(.7535) (.0491) (.1773) 
a 
-.2940** .0058 .2684 .5262 
(.1756) (.0088) (.0822) 
Table 4.10 Interest rate spread for banks and credit unions 
regressed on selected market variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Row Sa Constant Bs 
Rate spread for -1.0155 -1.0378 -.2589 
first quarter of (3.389) (3.0366) 
states with (1.0085) 
smallest loan size 
Rate spread for 1.0802 2.2696 -2.4559 
second quarter of (4.3124) (3.4832) (2.9315) 
states with next 
smallest loan size 
a 
Rate spread for .0046 -.9538 I.0717** 
third quarter of (1.4Ô9) (.8093) (.6127) 
states with next 
largest loan size 
a 
Rate spread for I.6138** .3841 -.$448 
last quarter of (.9944) (.8090) (1.1442) 
states with largest 
loan size 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript («) indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while (**) indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Qs Mg Lg 
(1.4913) (.0832) (.2045) 
.7300 .0539 .2571** .1872 
î"
1.4169 .0100 .8059^ .4536 
(1.2755) (.0904) (.6118) 
_ a 
-.3652 -.0128 .5521* .4841 
(.3271) (.0142) (.2347) 
a a 
-.1511 .0143** .1898* .7501 
(.2496) (.0099) (.0771) 
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were run on the data divided into halves and quarters, the co­
efficients for the different loan sizes were consistent for 
each set of regressions. 
Though the ceiling differentials are comparatively smaller 
for banks and credit unions than for banks and finance com­
panies, this variable still accounts for the greatest amount 
of variation in the rate spread. Therefore, ceiling differen­
tials again appear to be the principal cause for the observed 
market segmentation. 
There is again a contradiction in signs when comparing 
the effects of supply (Qs) on markets where loans tend to be 
small as opposed to markets where they tend to be larger. For 
smaller loan states, Qg carries a positive sign (Table 4.9, 
row 2 and Table 4.10, rows 1 and 2). As the quantity of loans 
extended by banks increase relative to credit unions, the rate 
spread increases. This is not surprising, however. Recall 
for banks and finance companies that in states with smaller 
loans, an increase in the quantity of loans extended by banks 
was associated with a decrease in the rate spread. It was 
suggested that this increase might be associated to some extent 
with the ability of banks to charge higher rates under higher 
rate ceilings. Consider, then, that credit unions are general­
ly subject to even more severe ceiling restraints than banks. 
Accordingly, in those states emphasizing smaller sized loans, 
an increase in the quantity of loans extended by banks relative 
to credit unions are associated with an increase in the rate 
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spread, as banks serve a customer willing to pay a higher price.. 
For states where average loans tend to be large, the rate 
spread varies in accordance with increases or decreases in 
quantity differences between banks and credit unions. As hy­
pothesized, this implies that structural and cost differences 
between these institutions support observed differences in 
rates. This relationship is significant at the 10 percent 
level for the 25 states with the largest loan size (Table 
row 3). It is not significant when the data is divided into 
quarters but the "t" statistic for the third quarter is greater 
than one (Table 4.10) and the evidence is certainly consistent 
with the stated hypothesis. 
Rate ceiling and quantity differentials contribute most 
to explaining variations of rate spreads in the market. But, 
in general, market segmentation is far less apparent between 
banks and credit unions than for banks and finance companies. 
Indeed, the small difference in rate spreads between banks and 
credit unions and the comparatively low ceilings each is subject 
to would suggest the strong possibility of the existence of 
some degree of direct competition between them. As already 
suggested, low rate ceilings encourage banks and credit unions 
to vie for a common class of borrowers, which necessitates 
some interinstitutional rivalry. This observation is supported 
by the fact that except for one occasion (Table 4.10, row 3) 
differences in demand D are not significantly related to rate 
spreads, though observations vary widely among states. Thus, 
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restrictions on the mobility of borrowers do not seem to be a 
major factor contributing to the observed segmentation. 
Also, the evidence in Tables 4,6 through 4.8 indicate 
that though the rate spread tends to decline as the loan size 
increases, the decline is far less significant for banks and 
credit unions than it was for banks and finance companies.^  No 
statistically significant increase or decrease in market seg­
mentation is apparent for banks and credit unions among markets 
with different sized loans. This, perhaps, inglies that some 
competition is already of consistent in^ ortance for each group 
of markets. 
Branch banking displays some very small evidence of being 
associated with a decline in interest rate spreads. In Table 
4.9 where the data was divided between the smallest 25 states 
and the largest 25 states based on size of loans, the sign is 
consistently negative, implying an increase in interinstitution-
al competition. For neither loan category is the variable 
significant at the 10 percent level; however, when loan size 
is larger, the t statistic is greater than one. In Table 4.10 
where the data is divided into quartiles, the sign alternates 
between positive and negative, none being significant. Thus, 
the possible association of decreased segmentation and branch­
ing can be pointed out, but the evidence cannot be construed to 
See Appendix II for the analysis of variance tables and 
comparison tests between mean rate spreads for different loan 
sizes. 
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any definite conclusion. 
Measures of concentration are not significantly related 
to rate difference variations. This occurs despite the fact 
that concentration ratios vary widely across states. This 
result is consistent with much of the evidence found thus far 
pointing to the conclusion that banks and credit unions are 
competitors. 
The evidence concerning banks and credit unions indicates 
that differences in interest rate ceilings is the principal 
force causing observed market segmentation. At the same time, 
rate ceilings for both institutions, though different, are low 
and encourage banks and credit unions to serve a common type 
of borrower. It is a fair conclusion to state, therefore, that 
banks and credit unions under present market structure are 
considerably more competitive with one another than are banks 
and finance companies, 
Credit Unions: Their General Competitive Impact 
It has been concluded that commercial banks compete more 
directly with credit unions than with finance companies. Yet 
it was SLISO noted that commercial banks are generally under 
somewhat less severe rate ceiling constraints and have a great­
er flexibility than credit unions in broadening their spectrum 
of borrowers. It, therefore, occurs to ask whether a sharp­
ening of competition between banks and credit unions further 
encouraged banks to broaden their range of borrowers and to 
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con^ ete more directly with finance companies. Indeed, it has 
been argued elsewhere that credit unions are ancillary lenders 
ajid where their presence in a market increases, it tends to 
unify the market between all other lenders (24), 
Assuming then that the presence of credit unions in a mar­
ket tends to increase the degree of competition between all 
firms, one would expect to find that the increased presence of 
credit unions forces the rate spreads between banks and finance 
companies to decline. 
The influence of credit unions is introduced into the 
analysis as the number of credit unions per person (CU) in a 
market. Placing this variable into the model examining the 
rate spread between banks and finance companies, the results 
are presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. 
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that credit 
unions act to bridge the competitive gap between financial 
institutions in the personal loan market. For all fifty state 
observations, the sign for CU is negative though not quite 
significant at the 10 percent level.(Table 4,11, row l). When 
the data wre divided in half the coefficients for CU carried 
the correct negative sign but only for the smaller loan size 
category was it significant. When the data were divided into 
quartiles the coefficient of CU for the first th&ee categories 
carried a negative sign and two of the four coefficients were 
significantly negative (Table 4.12). It is suspected that the 
role of credit unions in unifying the market becomes less . 
Table 4.11 Interest rate spreads between banks and finance com­
panies with the effect of credit unions present 
Dependent 
Variable 
Row Si Constant Bi 
_ a 
Rate spread for 8.03% -.^ 589 2.8300 
all fifty state (5.5395) (1.0447) (4.9772) 
observations 
_ a 
Rate spread for 12.7881* .5398 1.9865 
the twenty-five (7.466o) (1.5541) (10.478) 
states with 
smallest loan 
size 
Rate spread for -.3928 -.2571 16.0958**^  
the twenty-five (5.4l64) (I.6133) (9.9668) 
states with the 
largest loan size 
a 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript (*) indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while («*) indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Qi Ml Li CU R2 
-.9694 
(.9628) 
-2.4971 
(1.4551) 
-.0871** 
(.0648) 
-.1419 
(.1059) 
.6057* 
(.0954) 
.5446* 
(.1338) 
-1.4488 
(1.5374) 
-3.6299 
(2.582) 
.5841 
.6634 
.6980 -.0850 .6131*^ -1.0425 .5739 
(1.335) (.0898) (.1794) (2.1147) 
Table 4.12 Interest rate spreads for banks and finance compan­
ies with the possible effects of credit unions present 
Dependent 
Variable 
Si Constant Bi 
Rate spread for first -12.1241 l,66lO 44,l4o8 
quarter of states with (27.3565) (3.0178) (49.8265) 
smallest loan size 
a 
Rate spread for second 31.2748* -.4640 -15.1137 
quarter of states with (9.919) (2.3978) (11.5282) 
next smallest loan size 
Rate spread for third 5.1954 .8852 6.3022 
quarter of states with (12.2044) (2.5701) (16.4358) 
next largest loan size 
Rate spread for last -.6345 -I.630 23.9329 
quarter of states with (11.4007) (2.785) (22.7790) 
largest loan size 
The values in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
superscript (*) indicates the coefficient to be significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level while («» ) indicates 
the coefficient to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Qi Ml Li CU R2 
-8.454 .0464 .5748 * -6.114 .8082 
(5.7549) (.1995) (.1957) (5.871) 
-2.313**^  -.4o68*^  .7731*^  -11,6621*^ .7819 
(1.4379) (.2220) (.3112) (4.4890) 
1.4735 -.0655 .7828*^ -4.400.8243 
(3.8836) (.1211) (.2813) (2.9764) 
.3972 -.1953 .3767 2.021 .5510 
(3.7815) (.1659) (.4030) (8.585) 
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apparent when loan sizes increase because market segmentation 
between banks and finance companies is decreasing independently 
of credit unions. Therefore, the statistical significance of 
the variable for credit union does not show up in the regres­
sions. 
The evidence suggests that credit unions not only compete 
with commercial banks in the market but where their presence 
increases they also force banks and finance companies to be­
come more responsive to each other's presence in the market. 
Access to credit unions is becoming more readily available to 
borrowers and it seems the effect is to reduce rate differences 
between institutions in general and to minimize rate levels 
in particular. 
Finallya it is re-emphasized that the effects of credit 
unions as described here only serve to reduce the rather large 
competitive gap between lending institutions in the personal 
loan market. Given present market structure and statutory 
restrictions, they in no way eliminate observed segmentation 
and a significant coefficient should not be interpreted as 
implying such a consequence. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Commercial "banks and finance companies are not competi­
tors, either in the sense of perfect competition or in the 
sense of direct rivals. This absence of competition, this 
market segmentation is principally the result of differences 
in interest rate ceilings that these institutions are re­
quired to operate under. These rate barriers essentially 
force banks to service the needs of a low-risk, low-cost 
customer and encourage finance companies to remain in that 
segment of the market immune from the actions of banks. Banks 
and credit unions also are restricted in their ability to 
compete. Again the restriction is tied most obviously to 
the legal pricing constraints imposed on the two institutions. 
One may conclude, therefore, that among the several products 
that banks now provide as multiproduct firms, they do not 
compete v;ith other institutions for the product of direct 
cash personal loans. 
Having acknowledged this segmentation and the force be­
hind it, other evidence can be cited which suggests that if 
banks were allowed to do so, they would compete along a broad­
er spectrum of the personal loan market. In the analysis, as 
the cost of lending decreases, price barriers have a less 
severe impact on market interaction and segmentation is less 
apparent. Also, the overall extent of segmentation between 
banks and credit unions is less than banks and finance 
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companies. This smaller difference in rates for "banks and 
credit unions is directly associated with the smaller ceiling 
differences between them. Indeed, where the activities of 
credit unions increase in a market, it encourages some marginal 
but consistent reduction of rates between banks and finance 
companies. Finally, the very fact that rate spreads decrease 
as well as increase with movements in ceiling differentials, 
implies that these institutions would compete with one another 
if allowed to do so. 
The obvious implication of these findings is that the 
artificial wedge to market integration should be eliminated. 
Removing the ceilings or at least removing the inequities in 
the ceilings would permit the market to reflect more accurately 
the competitive interaction of supply and demand. Their re­
moval would improve the mobility of both borrowers and lenders 
and, thereby, lnmrove the competitive efficiency of the market-
This does not mean that price levels will necessarily drop 
throughout the market. The artificial barriers most likely 
have created a misallocation of loanable funds within the 
market. Where prices have been artificially low (or high), 
they will, with the removal of the constraints, adjust upward 
(or downward). Increased competition would only imply that 
prices would become more nearly alike between all firms, re­
flecting the free interplay of supply and demand in the market. 
In the analysis there was some evidence indicating that 
the market might remain segmented regardless of the rate 
86 
ceilings. The income variable for the bank-finance company 
relationship suggests that lenders and borrowers do have cer­
tain preferences which would continue to separate the market. 
The quantity variable for the bank-credit union relationship 
also implies that structural differences between institutions 
would continue to cause some segmentation. However, with the 
expanding and agressive nature of the financial sector of the 
economy in general and the banking industry in particular, con­
tinued segmentation is not expected. It is difficult theoret­
ically to conceive of an institution neglecting any part of 
the spectrum of borrowers if profits can be earned. This 
reasoning and the evidence cited above provides a strong case 
for why equilization of rate ceilings would reduce or eliminate 
segmentation. 
Instead of removing rate ceilings, the corporate holding 
company might be used to eliminate, at least, the effects of 
segmentation in the personal loan market. The holding company 
could control, for example, a bank and also a finance company 
and a credit union. It would, then, direct the flow of funds 
among each of its subsidiary institutions until the rate 
accurately reflect supply and demand conditions in the market. 
But such a solution is inefficient and creates its own problems. 
It does not eliminate the misallocation of funds since only 
holding companies will be in a position to adjust the movement 
of funds. Banks, finance companies and credit unions which 
are not a part of a holding company would continue to be 
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restricted in their market actions. Moreover, the holding 
company would be afforded a competitive advantage over these 
other institutions which would perpetuate other market imper­
fections. To illustrate, assume that the personal loan market 
is segmented. Finance companies lend to a high-risk borrower 
and charge high rates while banks lend to a low-risk borrower 
and charge low rates. No rivalry is involved. Therefore, the 
idea is accepted that the holding companies should be allowed 
to own both banks and finance companies, thereby stimulating 
competition and improving the allocation of loanable funds. 
But assume that sometime later, state and federal legislators 
determine that price ceiling differentials between these 
institutions are a wedge inhibiting market competition. The 
ceilings are removed. During the period between these two 
legislative actions assume, however, that the holding company 
achieves a dominant position in both market segments. It be­
comes a price discriminating monopolist. The holding company 
may identify and separate demand through the vehicles of the 
bank and finance company. Having the dominant position, 
competition is not stimulated and the market remains, in fact, 
segmented» if the objective is to broaden and improve the 
entire spectrum of competition between lenders, then such 
premature approval of acquisitions by holding companies would 
surely offset this goal. 
Competition will best be served and an efficient alloca­
tion of resources will best be achieved by the removal of the 
B8 
inequities in the rate ceiling under which these institutions 
are presently forced to operate. 
Finally, the conclusions of the analysis are qualified to 
the extent that the data and model may have oversimplified some 
of the competitive relationships. For example, the data re­
flect statewide averages. Personal lending is a local activity 
and the appropriate market boundary is the city or town within 
which the operating office is located. Also, the model could 
not identify individual cost considerations in the supply var­
iable or structural differences in both the supply and demand 
variables. All that should be said about such shortcomings is, 
perhaps, that they are real and that the only remedy is better 
and more comprehensive data. The conclusions from this study 
are reasonable, and should be carefully considered as they 
relate to the relationship of commercial banks, finance com­
panies, and credit unions and competition for personal loans. 
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APPENDIX I 
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Ordinary Least Square." and Multicollinearity 
A frequent problem in empirical research using ordinary 
least squares is that of intercorrelation between explanatory 
variables. The ordinary least squares model assumes that the 
explanatory variables have no dependence between them. Problems 
of multicollinearity occur, therefore, when some or all of the 
explanatory variables are highly interdependent. If the 
problem is serious, then for the regression equations the pre­
cision of the estimated coefficients may fall. Such lack of 
precision may occur because the errors are highly correlated 
or because the error terms are large. This in turn may lead 
the investigator to incorrectly dismiss variables because their 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero though 
the variable, in fact, may be important (I7). 
It was thought that the problem of collinearity might be 
of some importance in regressions for equations 3.2 and 3.3 
because of the effect that variations in rate ceilings might 
have on the quantity variable. To consider this possibility 
and also to judge the extent of collinearity between all ex­
planatory variables in the model, a test suggested by D. E. 
Farrar and R. Glauber (12) was implemented. The test relies 
on the consideration of the coefficient of multiple determina­
tion (R®) between any one explanatory variable and all other 
explanatory variables in the regression equation. Using the 
R^  value an F statistic is computed for each explanatory 
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variable. The test assumes that the more significant the F 
statistic, then the greater the difficulty of intercorrelation 
among the explanatory variables and the more caution one must 
take in interpreting the coefficients in the regression. 
The F statistic is defined as: 
(l-R|)/n-k+l 
where 
i = the i^  ^explanatory variable 
n = the number of sample observations 
k = the number of variables in the equation 
The F statistic was calculated for each explanatory vari­
able described in equation 3.2 for banks and finance companies 
and equation 3.3 for banks and credit unions. The statistic 
was calculated where data from all fifty states were used in a 
single regression and where the data "vere divided in the 25 
smallest and 25 largest states based on size of the loan. The 
results of the analysis are presented in Table Al.l for banks 
and finance con^ anies and Table A1.2 for banks and credit unions. 
For finance companies and banks only the branch banking 
variable and the income variable show any evidence of signifi­
cant interdependence. The F statistic for these two variables 
is significant at the 5 percent level, but they are just sig­
nificant. Also, for credit unions and banks the branch banking 
variable and monopoly variables show a significant F value. 
Table A1.1 Test for multicollinearity in the regression analysis 
for commercial banks and finance companies 
Selected 
Observation Bi 
All fifty state .5842 ,2469 
observations p 12.?62 * 2.8860 • 
Twenty-five states .2373 .2101 
with smallest loan 
size F 1.182 1.0115 
Twenty-five states R^  .4329 .4478 
with largest loan  ^ 2.9053*® 3.0820*® 
The R^  term indicates the amount of variation for each ex­
planatory variable explained with respect to all other explan­
atory variables. The F statistic, computed from the R^  term, 
provides the statistical measure of degree of multicollineari­
ty. A superscript (*) indicates the degree of multicollineari­
ty to be significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Qi Ml Li Degree of Freedom 
.1648 .10126 .1992 4,44 
1.9736 (.9916) 2.1902 
.1912 .-2038 .2695 4,19 
.8984 .9727 1.4036 
.0590 .1823 .2001 4,19 
.2382 .8473 .9506 
Table A1.2 Test for nrulticollinearity in the regression analysis 
for commercial banks and credit unions 
Selected 
Observation Bg D Qs 
All fifty state .2683 .1208 .1953 
observations p 3.2209*^  1.2110 2,1092 
Twenty-five .6272 ,1715 .3529 
sSîfesfSan  ^ 6.3951*^  .7866 2.07* 
size 
Twenty-five R^  .1353 .2200 .2927 
!argest"loL  ^ .5947 1.0731 1.5756 
Size 
T^he R^  term indicates the amount of variation for each ex­
planatory variable explained with respect to all other explan­
atory variables. The F statistic, computed from the R^  term, 
provides the statistical measure of degree of multicollineari-
ty. A superscript (*) indicates the degree of multicollineari 
ty to be significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Ms Ls Degree of Freedom 
.2865 .0394 4,44 
3.5370** .3577 
•6719 a .1591 4,19 
7.7818 * .7191 
.1872 .1664 4,19 
.8768 .7598 
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which indicate some measure of collinearity. No other variables 
are significant and in particular, the quajitity and ceiling 
variables show no significant intercorrelation. 
Such results are impressive especially when it was noted 
by Farrar and Glauber that ^snerally most of the values 
would be statistically significant. That is, the hypothesis 
of orthogonality among the explanatory variables would be re­
jected. They suggested that inspection of the F^^ value would 
show which variables were most effected by multicollinearity. 
The results for the model in this analysis show only 
minor problems with intercorrelation and the regression re­
sults presented in Chapter IV seem quite reasonable. 
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APPEWniX II 
IQg 
Analysis of Variance and Comparisons of Rate Spreads 
when Categorized by Loan Size 
In Tables 4,3 and 4.4 and Tables 4,7 and 4.8, the interest 
rate spread data for the fifty states were divided into differ­
ent groupings by loan size. The first grouping was between 
rate differences for the first 25 states having the smallest 
loan size and the next 25 states having the largest loan size. 
The second grouping divided the observations for the fifty 
states into quartiles, with the criterion for the division 
again being the size of the loan. Here the statistical signifi­
cance of differences between mean rate spreads is examined for 
each of the different grouping arrangements. 
Table A2.1 provides the necessary information to test the 
hypothesis that the mean rate spread for the 25 smaller loan 
size states is equal to the spread for the larger 25 loan size 
states versus the hypothesis that they are not equal. This 
involves comparisons for both banks and finance companies and 
banks and credit unions. Tables A2,2 and A2.3 are the analysis 
of variance tables of rate spreads for the data divided into 
quarters for banks and finance conçanies and banks and credit 
unionsa respectively. Computing the F value from information 
presented in the first three columns of the tables enables 
one to test the hypothesis that the mean rate spreads between 
states with different loan sizes are equal versus the hypoth­
esis that they are not equal. 
Table A2.1 Difference between mean rate spreads, the pooled 
variance, and t statistic for the twenty-five smallest loan 
size states versus the twenty-five largest loan size states 
Spread for Smallest 
States vs. Spread for 
Largest States 
Pooled 
Variance 
t* 
Statistic 
Banks and 
Finance 
Companies (Si) 1.98* 1.56 1.586 
Banks and 
Credit 
Unions (Sg) .54 .84 
00 00 in 
T^he superscript (*) indicates that the difference between 
spread means is significant at the 10 percent level 
Table A2.2 Analysis of variance table for rate spreads grouped 
into quarters by loan size for commercial banks and finance 
companies 
Degrees of Sum of Mean a 
Freedom Squares Square F 
Total 49 999.2% 
Between Means _3 102.26 3?0.08 1.748 
Error 46 896.98 19.49 
T^he superscript (*) indicates that the difference between 
spread means is significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table A2.3 Analysis of variance table for rate spreads grouped 
into quarters by loan size for commercial banks and credit 
unions 
Degrees of Sum of Mean & 
Freedom Squares Square F 
Total 49 256.04 
Between Means 11.11 3.70 .695 
Error 46 244.93 5.32 
T^he superscript (*) indicates that the difference between 
spread means is significant at the 10 percent level 
Where the data were divided into quartiles, certain non-
orthogonal comparisons of rate spreads were computed. The 
results of these comparisons are presented for banks and fi­
nance companies in Table A2.4 and for banks and credit unions 
in Table A2.5. Comparisons were made only where the average 
rate spread decreased as the size of the loans increased. 
The analysis of variance results and comparison of mean 
differences among selected loan size groupings do not consis­
tently Indicate that the means spreads are statistically dif­
ferent, The observation may be aadej however, that the 
evidence for commercial banks and finance compajiies is much 
stronger than that for banks and credit unions. The calculated 
P statistics for banks and finance companies, when not signifi­
cant, are consistently close to the 10 percent significance 
level. On the other hand, the significance level for the mean 
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Table A2.4 Comparisons between spread means for selected loan 
categories for commercial banks and finance companies 
Difference in F ^  
Spread Means Statistic 
States with smallest loan 
sizes compared to states 
with next smallest loan 
sizes 
States with next to largest 
loan sizes compared to states 
with largest loan sizes 
States with smallest loan 
sizes compared to states 
with largest loan sizes 
1.723 2.577 
2.366 .635 
3.114*' 5.19 
T^he superscript (*) indicates that the difference between 
means is significant at the 3 percent level 
Table A2,5 Comparisons between spread means for selected loan 
categories for commercial banks and credit unions 
a 
Differences in F 
Spread Means Value 
States with second smallest 
loan sizes to states with 
second largest loan sizes 1.299 I.90 
States with second smallest 
loan sizes to states with 
largest loan sizes .820 2.75 
T^he superscript (*) indicates difference between means is 
significant at the 5 percent level 
io6 
spread differences among selected loan sizes for banks and 
credit unions are not consistent and, in general, the F values 
could not be considered as near a reasonable significance level. 
